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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this research is to examine the effect of bank 
monitoring as an alternative of corporate governance mechanisms on 
the borrowers’ firm value. The strengths of bank monitoring on the 
borrowers are measured based on the magnitude of the bank loan, the 
size of the loan from banks with high monitoring quality, the length of 
a bank loan outstanding period, and the number of lenders. The 
research hypotheses were tested using multiple regression model with 
a sample of 230 companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 
2009. The empirical results show that only the size of the loan from 
banks with high monitoring quality and the number of lenders 
significantly influences the borrowers’ firm value. These findings 
imply that only banks with high monitoring quality could play an 
important role in the corporate governance and therefore increasing 
the firm value by their monitoring function.  Furthermore, bank 
monitoring is less effective if a company borrows from many banks, 
and therefore decreasing the firm value.   
 
Keywords: corporate governance, bank monitoring, bank loan, firm 
value. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of good corporate governance has been formally 
introduced in Indonesia after the 1998 economic crisis.  The basic 
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principle of corporate governance is to ensure the fulfillment of the 
company’s responsibility to the company’s stakeholders. Internal 
corporate governance structure, such as the board of commissioners
2
 
and audit committee, has been set up in companies in order to have a 
controlling function for management decisions and actions.  Agency 
problems between shareholders and management, between creditors 
and shareholders, and between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders, are expected to be minimized with the existence of good 
corporate governance. Corporate governance enhances effective 
decision-making control, prevent opportunistic actions that are 
inconsistent with the interests of the stakeholders, and reduce the 
information asymmetry between management and stakeholders of the 
company. One corporate governance mechanisms that can be used to 
address the agency problem is to perform both internal and external 
monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). External monitoring is 
primarily done by external auditors, but creditors can also play an 
important role in monitoring by external parties. 
 
In line with the objective of corporation to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth by increasing firm value, many companies use debt financing 
combined with equity financing to get the interest tax shield benefit 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963).  The source of debt financing could be 
from the capital market by issuing bonds, or from financial 
institutions.  The bond market in Asia is relatively undeveloped; 
therefore most large companies in Asia including Indonesia are still 
use bank loans as their source of debt financing (Nam and Nam, 
2004).  When a company uses bank loans as its source of financing, 
the bank becomes one of the company's stakeholders, who have the 
interest to monitor any activity undertaken by the company’s 
management. One of the main reasons why banks do the monitoring 
activity is to reduce the credit risk (Ahn and Choi, 2009). Agency 
problems could arise between creditors and shareholders, because 
each of them has different contingent claim amount on the firm value. 
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Therefore, creditors need to make sure that the funds obtained by the 
company are used appropriately as planned and efficiently.  In this 
case, the bank will do a monitoring function, which is somewhat 
similar to the function of board of commissioners and audit committee 
in corporate governance. If the management could act prudently with 
the existence of bank monitoring, the firm value should increase 
eventually 
 
This study discusses the influence of the monitoring role of banks as 
an alternative of corporate governance mechanisms to increase the 
value of a company that has a bank loan. This study refers to previous 
research conducted by Ahn and Choi (2009) and Hermawan (2009).  
Both studies have tried to examine the role of bank monitoring in the 
borrowers’ quality of earnings.  Hermawan (2009) measured the level 
of bank monitoring based on the total amount of loan from banks that 
are considered having good monitoring capability on their borrowers.  
Ahn and Choi (2009) used the magnitude of bank loans, lead bank 
reputation, length of  bank loan, and the number of bank lenders to 
measure the level of bank monitoring.  In contrast to Ahn and Choi 
(2009) and Hermawan (2009), this study examines the influence of 
bank monitoring as an alternative of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the firm value.  The objective of this study is to 
provide empirical evidence in Indonesia regarding the possibility of 
external corporate governance mechanisms conducted by the bank as 
one of the company’s stakeholders to increase the firm value.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Role of Bank Monitoring as Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
Basically, in some countries where the economic system is 
characterized by bank financing as an external source of financing, 
such as Japan and Germany, corporate governance mechanisms can 
also be done by the banks through direct ownership or financing 
mechanisms (Charkham, 1995).  Moerland (1995) showed that agency 
problem is reduced in such situation. Some literatures in financial 
economics explore how banks run their unique role and how 
relationships between the banks and the companies affect the 
company's business. However, there are still only few empirical 
 4)     Dina, A.R.A. & Hermawan, A.A. /Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting, 6(1), 1-24 
evidences about the monitoring role of banks as one of corporate 
governance mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Byers et al. 
(2008) convey some important insights about the extent to which the 
bank can replace the monitoring of internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms. They found the existence of positive 
association between loan announcements and the borrowers’ excess 
returns.  
 
The objective of bank monitoring is to reduce the banks’ credit risk by 
preventing borrowers’ opportunistic behavior both before and after 
the loan is approved. Prior to the loan approval, the borrowers can 
take opportunistic actions to be able to have higher  borrowing 
capacity, lower interest rates, and lower contract costs (Mishkin and 
Eakins, 2003). Borrowers have the possibility to manage their 
earnings to achieve such objectives.  Recently, managing earnings are 
not only done by managing discretionary accruals in the financial 
statement reporting, but also through real activites. Roychowdury 
(2006) states that there are three methods based on real activities that 
can be used by management to manipulate earnings: (1) Revenue 
manipulation by giving price discount or soft credit sales to boost up 
sales; (2) Reduction in discretionary expenditures such as research 
and development cost, human resources development cost, marketing 
costs, maintaince cost, etc.; (3) Overproduction.  Graham et al. (2005) 
found that management tend to use real activities manipulation than 
accruals to manage their financial reporting.  Therefore, borrowers’ 
opportunistic behavior to manage their earnings could possibly 
destroy the company’s value in the future.  After the loan is realized, 
borrowers still have an incentive to perform opportunistic actions. 
One of the reasons is to avoid default due to inability to meet the debt 
covenants. Some covenants are accounting-based measured, which 
depends on the borrowers’ financial performance. Generally, 
violations of debt covenants would have a negative impact such as 
higher interest rates, obligations for early repayment of loans, and 
additional restrictions on the borrowers’ activities (Beneish and Press, 
1993).   
 
Banks have specific interest to reduce the possibility of borrowers 
take such opportunistic actions that can reduce their repayment 
capacity. This bank monitoring will complement the monitoring 
function of internal corporate governance mechanism. Hopefully this 
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will have positive impact to borrowers’ firm value.  Treacy and Carey 
(1998) found that major banks in the United States are using 
qualitative and quantitative measurements for evaluating their credit 
risk. Their study showed that banks examine borrowers’ risk factors 
such as the financial statements reliability, the management quality, 
and the financial conditions.  These findings support the importance 
of effective monitoring on management actions in order to achieve a 
good corporate governance. 
 
Unlike individual creditors and other specialized agencies such as 
auditors, banks have a comparative advantage in monitoring their 
borrowers, because the banks have a low cost of delegation, 
economies of scale in monitoring activity, and the ability to access 
inside information (Ahn and Choi, 2009). Diamond (1984) and Fama 
(1985) focused their research on the banks’ ability to get better 
information about borrowers, and therefore banks have some 
advantages in carrying out the monitoring function. Diamond (1984) 
developed a theory about the delegation of monitoring, which prove 
the superiority of the banks in term of the cost of delegation. While 
Fama (1985) shows that banks have informational advantages over 
other financial intermediaries.  
 
The Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Value 
Many previous studies focused on the effect of corporate governance 
on the firm value. Some studies used the ownership structure as the 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggested that the greater ownership by management could reduce the 
agency problem between management and shareholders. However, 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found that there was no significant 
association between management shares ownership and company’s 
performance.  
 
Arsjah (2002) investigated the influence of corporate governance on 
firm’s performance.  Firm’s performance is measured by Price to 
Book Value (PBV) ratio and corporate governance is measured based 
on corporate governance index published by Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA) and Indonesian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (IICG). The result of her study is still mixed. Corporate 
governance has some influence on company’s performance only for 
the sample that used corporate governance index from CLSA, but for 
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the sample that used corporate governance index from IICG there was 
no significant influence.  Utama and Utama (2005) conducted a study 
on the practice of corporate governance and value creation of 
companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange. Corporate governance 
practices are measured by two measurements, i.e. the Corporate 
Governance Performance Index (CGPI) and the Corporate 
Governance Score (CGS). The company’s value is measured by the 
ratio of Economic Value Added (EVA) Spread and Market Value 
Added to Invested Capital (MVA/IC). This study also showed mixed 
results. Corporate governance measured by CGPI positively affects 
the firm’s value measured by EVA spread, although the association is 
still marginally significant. However, the association is negatively 
significant when firm’s value measured by MVA/IC. If corporate 
governance is measured by CGS, it has a significant and positive 
effect on firm’s value measured by MVA/IC, but it does not have any 
effect on firm’s value measured by EVA Spread.  
 
Black et al. (2003) proved the association between corporate 
governance and the firm value in Korea. This study used a Corporate 
Governance Index (CGI) as a proxy for corporate governance and 
Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value. The result showed statistically 
strong evidence that firms with higher CGI will have higher Tobin's 
Q. Silveira and Barros (2006) investigated the influence of the quality 
of corporate governance on market value of over 154 Brazilian 
companies listed on São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) in the year 
2002.  The quality of governance is measured by CGI, and the 
company’s market value is measured by Tobin's Q and Price to Book 
Value ratio. The findings also show that quality of corporate 
governance has positive and significant impact on the company's 
market value. 
 
The Effect of Bank Monitoring on Borrowers’ Firm Value 
Most studies of bank monitoring associated with syndicated loans, 
focusing more on the information asymmetry between the lead bank 
with the syndicated participants (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000, Lee 
and Mullineaux, 2004, Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007; Sufi, 
2007).  However, these studies did not test the monitoring role of 
banks in corporate governance.  Ahn and Choi (2009) provide 
empirical evidence regarding the role of bank monitoring on the 
borrowers’ earnings management behavior. Their study found that 
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earnings management behavior decreases if the strength of bank 
monitoring increases. The strength of bank monitoring is measured by 
the amount of bank loans, reputation (rank) of lead banks, length of 
bank loans, and the number of lenders. The results showed that the 
amount of bank loans, reputation (rank) of lead bank, and length of 
bank loan have negative effects on borrowers’ earnings management 
behavior, but the number of lenders has no significant effect. This 
result implies that bank monitoring has an important role just like the 
monitoring function of Board of Commissioners and Audit 
Committee as the company’s internal governance structure.  Therefore 
bank monitoring could also contribute in creating good corporate 
governance that will create firm value.   
 
Hermawan (2009) also conducted a study to examine the effect of 
bank monitoring role on the earnings informativeness measured by the 
earnings response coefficient (ERC). The proxy for bank monitoring 
effectiveness is the amount of loan from banks with good monitoring 
quality.  Banks that are considered having good  monitoring quality if 
the banks meet all the three conditions (1) Have large assets, i.e. 
above Rp 1 trillion; (2) Have Non Performing Loans < 5%; and (3) 
Have a rating of "very good" and “good” in bank performance rating 
conducted by InfoBank magazine (2007).  This study used a multiple 
regression model with 357 data observations (firm-year) of companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the years 2006-2007.   
The result reveals that bank monitoring does not have any significant 
influence on the earnings informativeness.  However, the earnings 
response coefficients (ERC) of companies with larger amount of loan 
from the bank with a good monitoring quality are higher than of 
companies with smaller loan from banks with good monitoring 
quality. Therefore, investors may have more confidence on corporate 
governance of companies that have borrowings from banks with good 
monitoring quality, and bank monitoring could be one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms to increase the firm value. 
 
The analogy that the role of banks monitoring can influence the 
increase of firm value is supported by Byers et al. (2008) who found 
the effect of loan announcement on the firm value associated with the 
characteristics of the borrowers’ corporate governance.  By using a 
sample of more than 800 commercial loan announcements during the 
period of 1980-2003, they found that the loan announcement has a 
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positive effect on the borrowers’ firm value if the borrowers have 
weak internal corporate governance. However, several other studies 
that specifically discuss the effect of bank monitoring on the 
performance and value of the company provided conflicting results 
(Degryse et al., 2008). Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) found that the 
relationship between banks and borrowers does not lead to borrowers’ 
profitability or higher growth. Their explanations for their findings 
are: (1) the cost of capital will increase due to higher interest rates 
paid to the banks; (2) banks are more risk averse and more 
conservative in their investment policies, therefore it can reduce the 
borrowers’ growth prospect.   
 
In contrast, Kang et al. (2000) proved that the relationship between 
banks and companies can facilitate investment policies that can 
increase shareholders’ wealth. Shepherd et al. (2008) also found 
positive and significant relationship between firm value and the 
existence of bank loan, especially in companies with high agency 
cost. By using the Governance Index (G-index) as a measure of 
managerial entrenchment and Tobin's Q as a measure of corporate 
value, they prove that the emergence of free cash flow as a result of 
the bank monitoring can increase the borrowers’ firm value. 
Furthermore, Van Overfelt et al. (2006) also provide empirical 
evidence regarding the effect of bank affiliation on the performance 
and risk of bank-affiliated companies. With a sample of 129 public 
companies in Belgium, they found that the bank affiliation has a 
positive impact on the ratio of market-to-book and return-on-assets. 
Bank's level of involvement has a positive effect on company 
performance and can significantly reduce the volatility of the return-
on-assets. The yield on stocks measured by the Sharpe ratio also 
showed a better performance for bank-affiliated companies. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
In general, the purpose of this study is to have an empirical evidence 
of how bank monitoring on the borrowers can be considered as an 
alternative of corporate governance mechanisms to improve the 
borrowers’ firm value.  The strength level of the monitoring function 
assumed to be influenced by the magnitude of the bank loans, the size 
of loans from banks with high monitoring quality, the bank loan 
outstanding period, and the number of lenders. 
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Magnitude of Bank Loans 
Banks should be willing to put greater attention to borrowers with 
higher amount of loan because the borrowers’ credit risk should be 
higher. Khalil and Parigi (1998) showed that the increasing amount of 
the loan can be a signal for banks to give greater attention in 
monitoring.  Kang et al. (2000) stated that the large amount of 
borrowers’ bank loans is positively associated with the banks’ motives 
to conduct monitoring activities. While Lee and Mullineaux (2004) 
argued that in the case of syndicated loans, banks that have a larger 
portion in the syndicated loan would have stronger motives to monitor 
than the other banks. In general, previous studies showed that banks 
will enhance their monitoring power when banks provide larger loans 
to a borrower. Ahn and Choi (2009) found that borrowers’ earnings 
management decreases as the size of the loan increases, which 
indicates that the banks monitoring function becomes more effective 
as the size of loans of the borrowers increases.  An effective 
monitoring should induce management to take actions that are best for 
the company.  Therefore, the first hypothesis of this study is:  
H1a : The size of a company’s bank loans has a positive effect on its 
PBV ratio. 
 
Bank Monitoring Quality   
The role of bank monitoring will be effective if and only if the bank 
has the capability to do a good monitoring function.  One of the 
factors that could affect the level of monitoring quality is the bank’s 
financial performance. The bank’s financial performance could reflect 
how the bank’s management manages the business as financial 
intermediaries.  If banks can manage their credit optimally, by having 
an effective monitoring on the borrower not only prior to but also 
after the credit approval, they will achieve an excellent financial 
performance.  Therefore, financial performance indicators and ratings 
could be used as a standard of bank monitoring quality.  Hermawan 
(2009) refers to the banks performance ratings published by InfoBank 
(2007) to consider the banks monitoring quality. The result showed 
that the higher proportion of loans in a company granted by banks that 
have high monitoring quality, the quality of earnings reported by the 
company is better. 
 
Within the framework of a bank's risk management, reputation risk is 
one of the main factors that determine the ability and credibility of the 
 10)     Dina, A.R.A. & Hermawan, A.A. /Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting, 6(1), 1-24 
bank in performing monitoring functions. This risk refers to the 
negative opinion of the banks’ depositors, from whom banks will get 
most of their funding. Ahn and Choi (2009) found that reputation 
(rank) of the lead bank in a syndicated loan significantly influenced 
the borrowers’ earnings management in an opposite direction.  Based 
on prior studies, bank monitoring function on the borrowers will be 
more effective if the bank has good monitoring capabilities.  
Therefore, companies that get loans from banks that have high 
monitoring quality, assumed to be highly monitored and they are not 
free to act opportunistically (Hermawan, 2009).  In other words, the 
larger the size of loans in a company granted by banks with high 
monitoring quality, the more effective the bank monitoring on the 
borrowers. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this study is:  
H2a :     Companies with large size of loans from banks that have 
high monitoring quality have PBV ratio higher than any 
other company. 
 
Length of Bank Loans Outstanding Period 
Rajan and Winton (1995) argued that the existence of debt covenants 
resulting from long-term loans in a company will provide incentives 
for banks to increase the strength of monitoring, especially when the 
covenants are costly. Also, banks will gain more information if they 
have a longtime relationship with the borrowers (Ongena and Smith, 
1998). The presence of long-term loans can reduce the duplication of 
monitoring costs incurred by banks (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). In 
general, previous studies suggest that the incentives of banks to 
conduct monitoring activities will increase with the longer loan 
period.  According to Ahn and Choi (2009), the bank monitoring 
function could be more effective if the outstanding period of the loan 
is longer.  Therefore, the third hypothesis of this study is:  
H3a  : The length of a company’s bank loans outstanding period  
has a positive effect on its PBV ratio. 
 
Number of Lenders 
Syndicated loan is one of the sources of external debt financing 
available for a company. Compared to loans from a single bank, 
syndicated loans can offer a better deal for companies, i.e. larger loan 
amount, and lower cost of debt (Ross et al., 2010).  From the 
perspective of the bank monitoring role, in a syndicated loan the 
process of credit analysis and risk asessment is done not only by the 
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lead bank, but by all the participating banks (Fraser et al., 2001). 
Therefore, syndicated loans provide a collective monitoring which 
could result in more intensive monitoring. Ahn and Choi (2009) used 
the total number of banks involved in syndicated loans as a proxy of 
number of lenders. They found that the number of lenders has no 
significant association with the firm’s earnings management. In 
contrast to Ahn and Choi (2009), this study does not focus on 
syndicated loans due to small number of sample firms (19 out of 230 
companies) that use syndicated loans. This study used the number of 
banks involved in financing a specific company. Based on the same 
arguments as Ahn and Choi (2009), it can be assumed that if a 
company has loans from more than one bank, then more banks are 
interested to perform monitoring functions. Thus the monitoring 
intensity is expected to increase with the increasing number of banks 
that provide loans to a company.  Therefore, the fourth hypothesis of 
this study is:  
H4a :     The number of banks that provide loans to the company has 
a positive effect on its PBV ratio. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Research Model 
The model used in this study is based on the models of Ahn and Choi 
(2009) and Hermawan (2009):  
PBVi = β0 + β1 MAGNITUDEi + β2 DMONQUALi + β3 LENGTHi + 
β4 NLENDERi + 
            β5 ROEi + β6 GROWTHi + β7 RISKi + β8 SIZEi + β9 
LEVERAGEi + εi  
Where: 
PBVi :  Price to Book Value Ratio of firm i at the end 
of the study period 
MAGNITUDEi : The ratio of the amount of bank loans to total 
assets of firm i at the end of the study period. 
DMONQUALi : Dummy variables (1.0) with a value of 1 if 
firm i at the end of the study period have the 
amount of borrowings from the bank with high 
monitoring quality greater than or equal to the 
median, and 0 if otherwise. 
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LENGTHi : Average loan outstanding period of firm i at 
the end of the study period. 
NLENDERi : The number of banks related to the 
outstanding loans of firm i at the end of the 
study period. 
ROEi : Return on Equity, the ratio of earnings to book 
value of equity of firm i at the end of the study 
period. 
GROWTHi : The growth rate of the firm i measured by 
sales growth rate at the end of the study 
period. 
RISKi : Firm risk measured by the beta of firm i at the 
end of the study period. 
SIZEi : Firm size measured by total sales of firm i at 
the end of the study period. 
LEVERAGEi : The ratio of total liabilities to total assets of 
firm i at the end of the study period. 
 
Population and Sample  
The population of this study consists of all companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2009. Using a purposive 
sampling method, there are 230 firms that meet all the criteria to be 
the sample for this study. Table 1 shows the sample determination in 
this study. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used are presented in Table 
2. Data that is considered as outliers i.e. has the value higher or lower 
than 3 (three) standard deviation from the  mean, has been winsorized.  
Based  on Table 2,  the average PBV ratio of the sample is 1.6993. It 
indicates that most of the companies used in the sample  have created 
firm value, although still relatively small becasue the average PBV 
ratio is less than 2.00. Besides, there are some companies that have 
PBV ratio lower than 1.00, meaning that those companies have not 
created value and therefore their market performance is poor.   
 
 
 Dina, A.R.A. & Hermawan, A.A. /Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting, 6(1), 1-24     (13 
Table 1. Determination of Sample 
Step Sample Criteria 
Number of 
Companies 
1 
Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) in 2009 
397 
2 Companies in financial industry  (67) 
3 
Companies which have their IPOs in the 
year 2009 
(11) 
4 Companies that have negative equity (19) 
5 Companies that have incomplete data (8) 
6 
Companies that do not have any bank 
loan in the year 2009 
(62) 
 Total samples used 230 
 
The average magnitudes of bank loans as ratio to total assets is 
0.1986. It indicates that the use of bank loans as the source of 
financing in the sample companies is not dominant.  In other words, 
companies used as the sample in this study have relatively low 
leverage.  From the monitoring quality perspective, there is only 44% 
of the sample obtain loans from banks in the category of good 
monitoring quality.  It means that more than half of the sample firms 
borrow from banks that are considered having low monitoring quality.  
 
Bank loan outstanding period measures the loan elapsed time since 
the loan is granted by banks. The average bank loans outstanding 
period is 2.86 years, or aproximately equivalent to 3 years. It indicates 
that most sample firms may have short-term bank loans only or 
recently acquired long-term bank loans.  The shortest bank loan 
outstanding period in the sample is 1 year and the longest period is 8 
years.  The average number of lenders in the sample firms is 3.48, 
with the minimum number is 1 lender and the maximum nubmer is 
13.  It indicates that most companies in the sampel borrows from more 
that one bank. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
PBV 0.07 5.68 1.5655 1. 4322 
MAGNITUDE 0.00 0.70 0. 1977 0. 1635 
DMONQUAL 0 1 0.44 0.497 
LENGTH (years) 1.00  8.00  2.8692  1. 6341  
NLENDER 1 13 3.48 3.015 
ROE (%) -99.32 64.14 7.2422 23.3224 
GROWTH (%) -91.49  478.69  4.7286  61.7330  
RISK -1.505 2.460 0.6220 0.74633 
SIZE (million Rupiah) 1,715  30,261,178  3,411,225  6,187,7919  
LEVERAGE 0.05 0.97 0.5171 0.1989 
 
PBVi: value of the firm measured by the ratio of price to book value of equity of firm i at the 
end of the study period, MAGNITUDEi: size of bank loans measured by the ratio of the 
amount of bank loans to total assets of company i at the end of the study period, 
DMONQUALi: bank’s monitoring quality measured by dummy variables (1.0) with a value 
of 1 if firm i at the end of the study period has the total borrowing amount from banks with 
high monitoring of quality greater than or equal to the median, and 0 if otherwise, LENGTHi: 
loan period measured by the average loan outstanding period in company i at the end of the 
study period, NLENDERi: number of lenders measured by the number of banks relate to the 
company i outstanding loan at the end of the study period, ROEi: company’s profitability 
measured by the ratio of net earnings before extraordinary items to book value of equity of 
company i at the end of the study period, GROWTHi: company’s rowth rate measured by the 
sales growth rate of company i at the end of the study period, RISKi: company's risk 
measured by the beta of firm i at the end of the study period, SIZEi: company’s size  
measured by total sales of company i at the end of the study period, LEVERAGE i: company’s 
capital structure measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of firm i at the end of 
the study period. 
 
Most companies in the sample have a moderate profitabilty, with 
average ROE of 6.85%.  The leverage of the sample measured by total 
liabilities to total assets is 51.90% on average.  It indicates that 
companies tend to have liabilities other than bank loans in a quite 
significant proportion.   The average sample firms’ size measured by 
the total sales is Rp. 3,423,950 million and the average sales growth 
rate of the sample firms in 2009 is 67.34%.. It indicates that most 
sample firms are large firms and have a relative high sales growth.    
RISK variable reflects the firm's risk as measured by beta that 
company. The average value of the sample firms’ beta is 0.6233, 
which means that on average the sample firms have a lower risk than 
the market. However, the low average value of beta can be also due to 
the inactively traded stock of some companies in the sample during 
the study period. 
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Correlation Analysis 
The result of the correlation analysis is presented in Table 3. The 
value of the dependent variable (i.e. PBV) has been transformed into 
logarithm value (LogPBV) to have a more normal distribution.  From 
the four main variables in the model, only DMONQUAL has a 
significant positive correlation with LogPBV. It indicates that firms 
with high amount of loans obtained from banks with high monitoring 
quality have higher increase in PBV.  
LogPBV variable correlates positively and significantly to all the 
control variables, i.e.  ROE, GROWTH, RISK, SIZE, and 
LEVERAGE. This relationship strengthens the findings from previous 
studies that profitability, size, growth rate, the level of leverage and 
risk the company will affect the increased value of the company. The 
correlation coefficients among all independent variables are relatively 
small, i.e. below 0.80. Thus, there is low likelihood of 
multicollinearity problems in the regression output for the research 
model.   
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Analysis 
 LogPBV MAGNITUDE DMONQUAL LENGTH NLENDER ROE GROWTH RISK SIZE LEVERAGE 
LogPBV 1.00          
MAGNITUDE 0.018 1.00         
 (0.788)          
DMONQUAL 0.149* -0.179** 1.00        
 (0.024) (0.006)         
LENGTH -0.018 0.043 0.028 1.00       
 (0.791) (0.514) (0.669)        
NLENDER -0.022 0.151* -0.423** -0.059 1.00      
 (0.736) (0.022) (0.000) (0.370)       
ROE 0.208** -0.229** -0.051 -0.018 -0.003 1.00     
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.443) (0.783) (0.961)      
GROWTH 0.133* -0.149* 0.094 0.175 -0.110 0.143* 1.00    
 (0.045) (0.024) (0.154) (0.008) (0.097) (0.030)     
RISK 0.151* -0.083 0.116 -0.035 0.184** -0.039 -0.074 1.00   
 (0.022) (0.212) (0.079) (0.602) (0.005) (0.552) (0.261)    
SIZE 0.319** -0.131* -0.081 -0.172** 0.453** 0.301** 0.068 0.271** 1.00  
 (0.000) (0.048) (0.223) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.305) (0.000)   
LEVERAGE 0.131* 0.534** -0.135* 0.032 0.207** -0.173** -0.039 -0.154* 0.158* 1.00 
 (0.047) (0.000) (0.041) (0.625) (0.002) (0.008) (0.560) (0.019) (0.016)  
*   Significant at the level of  α = 5% (2-tailed) 
** Significant at the level of level α = 1% (2-tailed) 
Amount in the bracket is the p-value 
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Hypothesis Testing Analysis 
1.1 The Effect of Magnitude of a Company’s Bank Loans on the 
Firm Value 
Based on the regression results in Table 4, the magnitude of bank 
loans in a company does not have any effect on the firm’s value.  This 
result does not support the finding of Ahn and Choi (2009) which 
states that the increasing amount of bank loans will reduce the 
borrowers’ earnings management.  Our finding also does not support 
Khalil and Parigi (1998) statement that the increasing amount of loan 
can be a signal for banks to increase the strength of the monitoring of 
the borrowers. The fact that the size of bank loans has no effect on the 
firm’s value indicates that the banks as creditors still do not give any 
contribution to the implementation of the company's corporate 
governance. This suggests that the monitoring role of external parties, 
in this case specifically banks, as corporate governance mechanisms,  
is still not as effective as the monitoring role of company's internal 
governance structure. 
Another possible argument of why the magnitude of firm’s bank loans 
does not have any effect on the value of the firm is that not all banks 
actually perform monitoring functions effectively.  Based on the 
descriptive statistics in Table 2, there is only 44% of the samples have 
their loans granted by banks with high monitoring quality. It indicates 
that even though a firm has used  a greater amount of bank loans in its 
capital structure, but if the banks do not have the capability of good 
monitoring on their borrowers, then the monitoring function 
conducted by banks will not contribute to the change in firm’s in 
value.  This explanation is consistent with the hypothesis 2a result that 
will be discussed next. 
 
Table 4. Regression Output 
 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients t-Statistic Sig. 
B 
(Constant)  -1.0667 -4.1459 0.0000 
MAGNITUDE + 0.2189 1.1655 0.1226 
DMONQUAL + 0.0963 1.7366 0.0420**  
LENGTH + 0.0014 0.0854 0.4660 
NLENDER + -0.0208 -2.0143 0.0226** 
ROE + 0.0026 1.7636 0.0396** 
GROWTH + 0.0005 1.1730 0.1211 
RISK - 0.0636 1.7890 0.0375** 
SIZE + 0.0646 3.2143 0.0008*** 
LEVERAGE + 0.2561 1.5511 0.0612* 
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R-squared 0.2032    
Adjusted R-squared 0.1706    
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0442    
F-statistic 6.2332    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000    
*** Significant at level α =  1% (one-tailed) 
** Significant at level α =  5% (one-tailed) 
* Significant at level α =  10% (one-tailed) 
 
LogPBVi: value of company i measured by logarithm value of price to book value of equity at 
the end of the study period, MAGNITUDEi: size of bank loans measured by the ratio of the 
amount of bank loans to total assets of company i at the end of the study period, 
DMONQUALi: bank’s monitoring quality measured by dummy variables (1.0) with a value 
of 1 if firm i at the end of the study period has the total borrowing amount from banks with 
high monitoring of quality greater than or equal to the median, and 0 if otherwise, LENGTHi: 
loan period measured by the average loan outstanding period in company i at the end of the 
study period, NLENDERi: number of lenders measured by the number of banks relate to the 
company i outstanding loan at the end of the study period, ROEi: company’s profitability 
measured by the ratio of net earnings before extraordinary items to book value of equity of 
company i at the end of the study period, GROWTHi: company’s rowth rate measured by the 
sales growth rate of company i at the end of the study period, RISKi: company's risk 
measured by the beta of firm i at the end of the study period, SIZEi: company’s size  
measured by total sales of company i at the end of the study period, LEVERAGE i: company’s 
capital structure measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of firm i at the end of 
the study period. 
 
The Effect of Bank Monitoring Quality on the Firm Value 
Based on the regression results in Table 4, bank monitoring quality 
has significant influence on the firm’s value. This means that the 
banks’ monitoring function on their borrowers really exists and is 
conducted effectively only if the banks have good monitoring 
capability.  The monitoring conducted by the banks then will 
contribute as a governance mechanism to increase the firm’s value.  
This finding is consistent with the finding of Ahn and Choi (2009) 
which states that the borrowers’ earnings management will decrease 
when the loans are from banks with higher rank of reputation. The 
result of this study also supports Hermawan (2009) who found that 
companies with larger proportion of loans from the bank with a good 
monitoring quality will improve the response of investors on 
companies’ earnings reflected on the stock returns. Therefore a good 
monitoring by the banks could prevent the borrowers to lower the 
earnings quality, so that investors become more responsive to the 
earnings information in the market.  
 
This result also supports Billett et al. (1995) which proves that the 
bank identity indicated by the credit ratings is positively associated 
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with the stock returns for companies that have bank loans. The 
identity of the bank gives a signal to investors about the two things, 
i.e. the bank knows the level of the borrowers’ risk and the bank has 
the capability of monitoring to ensure that the borrowers’ investment 
decisions and expenditures are increasing the firm’s value (Fama, 
1985).  Therefore, the monitoring role by the banks could be an 
alternative of corporate governance mechanisms only if the banks 
have good monitoring capability on their borrowers. 
 
The Effect of the Length of Bank Loans Outstanding Period on 
the Firm Value 
Based on the regression results in Table 4. the length of the loan 
outstandidng period has no influence on the firm value.  This result is 
not consistent with the finding of Ahn and Choi (2009) which states 
that the longer the bank loan period will reduce the borrowers’ 
earnings management, meaning that the bank monitoring should be 
more effective. One possible argument for the lack of influence of the 
loan outstanding period to the firm value in this study is because most 
of the loans obtained by the borrowers have an average elapsed time 
of 2.8 years, as shown in Table 2.  Out of the total samples (230 
companies), only 150 companies or about 65% have long-term loans, 
and the average elapsed time of 3.3 years. Therefore, the samples in 
this study may fail to capture the benefit of longer loan period in term 
of bank monitoring, i.e. long-term relationship between companies 
and banks that can strengthen the monitoring capacity from the bank 
perspective. The longer the bank loan period will provide incentives 
for banks to increase their monitoring efforts (Rajan and Winton, 
1995).  
 
The Effect of Number of Lenders on the Firm Value 
Based on the regression results in Table 4, the increase in the number 
of banks that provide loans to a company will a negative effect on the 
firm value.  This result supports the study of Preece and Mullineaux 
(1996) who found that increasing the number of banks as the company 
creditors will significantly decrease the firm value. Their finding were 
confirmed by the robustness test that provides evidence that when a 
company received a syndicated loan of over 3 (three) banks in it will 
have a lower value than firms that have loans from a single bank.  The 
explanation of this finding is that a syndicated loan involves a number 
of bank participants and in this situation the bank loan would be 
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similar to a publicly held bonds where the creditor are numerous and 
scattered. The monitoring function could become ineffective and it 
could be more difficult for banks to renegotiate loan terms.  
 
Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 2,  the average number of 
lenders in the samples is 3.47.  It supports the statement of Preece and 
Mullineaux (1996) that if the number of lenders is more than 3 (three) 
than the firm value will decrease.   Our finding in this study implied 
that bank monitoring becomes ineffective when a company deals with 
many banks as its source of debt financing, because each bank might 
rely on other banks to do the monitoring function on their borrowers 
and does not do the monitoring on their own.  However, the result of 
this study is not consistent with Ahn and Choi (2009) who found no 
influence of the number of banks in a syndicated loan on the 
borrowers’ opportunistic behavior.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research examines the effect of bank monitoring as an alternative 
of corporate governance mechanisms on the borrowers’ firm value. 
The strengths of bank monitoring are measured based on the 
magnitude of a company’s bank loan, the size of a company’s loan 
from the bank with a high monitoring quality, the length of a bank 
loan outstanding period, and the number of lenders in a company. The 
empirical results show that the bank monitoring quality and the 
number of lenders are significantly influence to the borrowers’ firm 
value. However, the magnitude of the company’s bank loan and the 
length of the bank loan period have no significant effect on the 
borrowers’ firm value. These findings imply that only bank with good 
monitoring quality that could play an important role in the corporate 
governance of bank-dependent firms, and could give a significant 
contribution in the company’s value creation by their monitoring 
function.  Furthermore, bank monitoring is less effective if the 
company borrows from more banks and can result in decreasing the 
firm value.   
 
There are several limitations of this study. The bank monitoring 
effectiveness is measured by certain proxies and is not based on an 
actual observation of how the monitoring is conducted by the bank.  
 Dina, A.R.A. & Hermawan, A.A. /Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting, 6(1), 1-24 (21 
The monitoring quality is also determined by the banks’ performance 
rating done by InfoBank magazine (2010).  Therefore, there may be 
some inaccuracy in the measurement of the bank monitoring quality. 
Further research should use other measurement to solve these 
limitations and provide more solid findings regarding the role of 
banks as external corporate governance mechanisms. 
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